Exploring the regulatory landscape for Major Hazard Facilities in NZ

Regulatory expectations: what “effective control of catastrophic risk” looks like in practice (not just paperwork)

Discussing common gaps found during inspections and what typically triggers formal action

Exploring what investigations consistently reveal about why controls fail (systems, leadership, contractors, asset integrity, change)

Learning from real events: discussing the common weak points that turn hazards into major incidents, and how to spot them earlier

Applying inherently safer design (ISD) and risk-based design aligned to ISO 12100 and ISO 31000: substituting, minimising, moderating, and simplifying to reduce catastrophic potential

Removing escalation pathways through layout, segregation, containment, isolation, redundancy, and fail-safe design

Designing for abnormal operations, shutdowns, start-ups, and emergencies

Integrating human factors through clear controls/alarms, safe access, and maintainability

Protecting design intent by managing change, temporary works, contractors, and ageing assets

Positioning human factors within major hazard risk management by embedding them into safety cases, critical controls, and risk assessments

Designing work for real conditions by aligning procedures, interfaces, alarms, and control systems with how work is actually performed

Integrating human factors into change and assurance by considering workload, fatigue, competence, and handovers during modifications and operational changes

Strengthening barriers and controls by ensuring human-system interactions support safe decision-making under normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions

Using human factors data to inform audits, verifications, incident reviews, and continuous improvement

Recognising frontline workers as an active risk control, not just rule followers

Identifying early warning signs seen on the frontline (degraded equipment, workarounds, abnormal conditions, time pressure)

Enabling stop-work authority and clear escalation pathways without fear of blame

Creating psychological safety so concerns are raised early and consistently

Capturing frontline feedback through handovers, field observations, and near-miss reporting

Integrating frontline insight into major hazard controls, assurance, and decision-making

Strengthening frontline performance during abnormal and emergency conditions

Limitations of linear root‑cause models in major hazard environments and the need for holistic system analysis

Overview of STAMP as a systems‑theoretic framework examining control, context, and organisational interactions rather than isolated “errors.

How regulators, industry bodies, companies, operators, and technology collectively shape safety outcomes

Using System‑Theoretic Process Analysis to proactively identify hazards, unsafe control actions, and systemic contributors before incidents occur

Using Causal Analysis based on System Theory to investigate incidents, uncover systemic contributors, and drive organisational improvement

The impact of fewer certifiers on project timelines and operational risk, and what can realistically be done to improve access, sequencing, and early engagement

Practical expectations around WorkSafe approvals, how operators can submit stronger applications, and what improves the likelihood of timely progress in an under-resourced system

Understanding the updated terminology, how protected places can exist within hazardous places, and what operators need to consider when seeking exemptions or managing overlapping obligations

Addressing the challenge of requirements spread across multiple regulations, guidance documents, and codes of practice and how duty holders can better interpret and integrate them

What earlier engagement, clearer documentation, and better scoping can do to reduce rework, delays, and misunderstanding

Options for strengthening specialist capability, knowledge sharing, and consistency across certifiers, regulators, and industry

Understanding ageing mechanisms including corrosion, fatigue, wear, embrittlement, and obsolescence in safety-critical equipment

Identifying asset-related major hazard risk by recognising how degraded assets weaken barriers and increase escalation potential

Maintaining design and operational integrity when original design assumptions, documentation, or vendor support no longer exist

Inspection, monitoring, and condition assessment techniques for ageing plant and infrastructure

Risk-based maintenance and life-extension decisions using engineering judgement, data, and risk analysis

Managing change and temporary repairs without introducing new major hazard risk

Assurance and governance including performance standards, verification, and regulator expectations

Understanding high-consequence hazard profiles across chemical, energy, and process-driven operations

Eliminating and reducing risk at source through inherently safer design (substitution, minimisation, moderation, simplification)

Engineering controls that perform under stress including containment, isolation, relief, and fail-safe systems

Preventing escalation and domino effects through layout, segregation, passive protection, and energy management

Human-system integration ensuring procedures, interfaces, and alarms support safe decision-making

Managing degradation and change to prevent erosion of mitigation effectiveness over time

Verification and assurance using performance standards, testing, and field validation

Case study: Bhopal Gas Disaster (1984)

Why global incidents matter: what low-probability, high-consequence events expose about system weakness

Chernobyl (1986): unsafe design assumptions, weak independent challenge, and governance failure

Fukushima (2011): underestimated extreme hazards, single-point dependencies, and loss of defence-in-depth

Common failure patterns: reliance on procedures, degraded safeguards, poor change management

NZ implications: designing for extremes, strengthening critical controls, improving assurance and preparedness